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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 The general issue we address is whether Fair Acres 
Geriatric Center, a county-operated intermediate care nursing 
facility, violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U.S.C. Section 794, when it denied admission to Margaret C. 
Wagner, a 65 year old woman afflicted with Alzheimer's disease.  
Although Fair Acres admits Alzheimer's patients, it denied 
admission to Mrs. Wagner because it determined that its facility 
and staff could not accommodate the behavioral manifestations of 
her disease. 
 The jury was asked to decide whether, despite her 
handicap of Alzheimer's disease, Mrs. Wagner was "otherwise 
qualified" for admission to Fair Acres within the meaning of 
  
section 504, including any reasonable accommodation Fair Acres 
was required to make.  Following the jury verdict in favor of 
Mrs. Wagner, the district court granted Fair Acres' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, and conditionally granted its motion 
for a new trial. 
 We find that there was legally sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict.  Thus, we will vacate the district 
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law for Fair Acres.  We 
are uncertain, however, that given the correct legal standards, 
the district court would have exercised its discretion in finding 
that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  
Thus we will also vacate the district court's conditional grant 
of Fair Acres' motion for a new trial and remand for 
reconsideration of this motion.   
 
 I. 
 In 1988, at age 58, Margaret Wagner was diagnosed as 
suffering from Alzheimer's disease, a chronic degenerative 
neurological disorder that impairs intellectual functioning.  
Alzheimer's is associated with and has a devastating effect on 
intellectual functions including memory, recognition, 
comprehension and basic functional ability.  As the disease 
progresses, basic skills are lost, such as the ability to feed, 
dress, groom or bathe oneself.  Mrs. Wagner suffers from a 
particularly difficult, but not unique, form of Alzheimer's 
disease which is characterized by screaming, agitation and 
aggressive behavior.   
  
 Initially, Mrs. Wagner was cared for by her husband, 
assisted by his two adult daughters and by visiting nurses 
supplied through the County Office of Services to the Aging, who 
provided care approximately 27 hours a week.  In the summer of 
1992, however, Mrs. Wagner suffered a marked deterioration in 
cognitive functioning and behavior associated with her dementia.  
As a result, her family could no longer satisfactorily care for 
her at home.   
 On August 23, 1992, Mrs. Wagner was admitted to Dowden 
Nursing Home, a private facility located in Newton Square in 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania.1  On September 2, 1992, she was 
transferred from Dowden to the Wills Geriatric Psychiatry Program 
operated by Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, due to Mrs. 
Wagner's severe episodes of agitated behavior and confusion.   
 On September 16, 1992, Wills made an initial referral 
for Mrs. Wagner to be admitted to Fair Acres Geriatric Center.  
Fair Acres is a 900-bed skilled intermediate nursing facility 
operated by the Delaware County Board of Institutional 
Management, licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Health and 
certified under Titles 18 and 19 of the Social Security Act.  
Fair Acres receives county, state and federal funding, including 
Medicare and Medicaid funding.  At least 98% of its patients are 
admitted under medical assistance.   
                     
1
.   Terressa Fleming, Mrs. Wagner's daughter, testified 
that financial reasons motivated the family to admit Mrs. Wagner 
to Dowden and that although her mother had been accepted at Fair 
Acres initially, the family was trying to obtain Medicaid 
approval prior to admitting her there.   
  
 Fair Acres' stated mission and goal is to provide care 
primarily for the geriatric community.  Approximately 60% of its 
patients suffer from Alzheimer's disease or some other form of 
dementia.  Although it has a staff-to-patient ratio of one to 
eight, it is not staffed or equipped to handle psychiatric 
residents.  Accordingly, if an applicant for admission poses a 
threat of injury to himself or others, the application is 
rejected.  An applicant's psychiatric history is reviewed to 
determine (1) if the applicant's primary diagnosis is medical, 
warranting nursing home placement and (2) if the applicant can be 
absorbed comfortably and appropriately into Fair Acres' geriatric 
population.  See Fair Acres' admission's guidelines containing 
its "Psychiatric Policy."  (A. 676). 
 On September 16, 1992, upon receiving Mrs. Wagner's 
application for admission, Fair Acres' Admissions Committee2 made 
an initial determination that Mrs. Wagner was not then suitable 
for admission, but placed her application on "hold" pending 
further information regarding her condition.  The Committee met 
again on October 8, 1992 and designated Mrs. Wagner's application 
as "medically disapproved," acting on the recommendation of its 
psychiatric consultant, Dr. Satyendra Diwan, that Mrs. Wagner was 
not appropriate for admission due to the behavioral problems she 
was exhibiting at Wills.   
                     
2
.   The Admissions Committee at Fair Acres is comprised of 
the Medical Director, the Director of Administration, the 
Director of Nursing, the Director of Psycho-Services, the 
specific caseworker, a community representative and a 
representative of the County Office for Services to the Aging.   
  
 Between Mrs. Wagner's second and third evaluations, 
Linda Hadfield, Fair Acres' admissions RN, visited Wills to speak 
with Mrs. Wagner's nurses and staff and to observe Mrs. Wagner 
firsthand.  Mrs. Wagner was put on "hold" again after the third 
admissions committee meeting on October 29, 1992.  Dr. Diwan's 
notes in the "comments" area of Mrs. Wagner's October 29th 
evaluation form indicated that Mrs. Wagner "needs more time" and 
was "not appropriate for Fair Acres."  (A. 226-227).   
 On December 30, 1992, due to contradictions in the 
documentation from Wills that had been submitted to Fair Acres, 
Ms. Hadfield made a second visit to Wills and on January 6, 1993, 
Dr. Diwan evaluated Mrs. Wagner for a fourth time.  After 
reviewing Wills' progress reports, Dr. Diwan noted that Mrs. 
Wagner was still agitated, confused and irritable as late as 
December 29, 1992, but recommended a further evaluation in six to 
eight weeks.  Finally, on February 17, 1993, a fifth evaluation 
took place.  Although Wills' hospital records indicated that Mrs. 
Wagner's behavioral problems had improved slightly, the records 
showed that she continued to experience episodes of 
combativeness, agitation and assaultiveness on a daily basis.  
Under "comments," Dr. Diwan noted that Mrs. Wagner was a 
"borderline case and will not fit into our milieu."  (A. 232).  
Accordingly, Mrs. Wagner was again denied admission to Fair 
Acres. 
 On April 12, 1993, approximately two months after her 
last evaluation by Fair Acres, Mrs. Wagner was admitted to Easton 
Nursing Center.  Easton Nursing Center is located approximately 
  
85 miles from the home of Mrs. Wagner's husband and children.  
Because this represents a commute by car of one and one-half 
hours each way, the number of visits between Mrs. Wagner and her 
husband and children was severely curtailed.  While Mrs. Wagner 
was at Wills, she was visited by her husband on a daily basis 
unless he was ill.  Due to the fact that her husband has vision 
only in one eye, he was unable to make the trip to Easton 
independently.  Consequently, while Mrs. Wagner was at Easton, 
her family was only able to visit her twice a week.   
 On May 21, 1993, Margaret Wagner, by her next friend 
George Wagner, filed a two count complaint in United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Count 
One alleged that Fair Acres had discriminated against Mrs. Wagner 
on the basis of her handicap, the behavioral aspects of her 
dementia, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by refusing to admit her to its nursing 
facility.  Mrs. Wagner sought a declaration that the acts of Fair 
Acres had violated her rights under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and sought injunctive relief enjoining Fair 
Acres from unlawfully excluding her from its facility and 
directing Fair Acres to admit Mrs. Wagner to its first available 
bed.  She also sought damages and an award of attorney's fees and 
costs.  In Count Two, Mrs. Wagner sought relief pursuant to Title 
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101, 12131.3   
                     
3
.   This claim is not before us on appeal.  At trial, 
counsel agreed with the court that the standards and proofs under 
  
 At trial, Mrs. Wagner introduced the testimony of three 
expert witnesses to support her claim that she was qualified for 
admission to Fair Acres in spite of the behavioral manifestations 
of her Alzheimer's disease.  Dr. Gary L. Gottlieb, a geriatric 
psychiatrist and the director of the geriatric psychiatry program 
at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, testified, 
based on his review of Mrs. Wagner's medical records, that as 
early as September, 1992, Mrs. Wagner was appropriate for the 
type of care provided by a nursing facility such as Fair Acres.  
Dr. Edward Kim, Mrs. Wagner's treating physician at Wills, 
testified that Mrs. Wagner could have been accommodated by a 
nursing home around the third week of October.  Finally, Mrs. 
Wagner introduced the testimony of Dr. Bijan Etemad, a 
psychiatrist at Easton Nursing Center (where Mrs. Wagner resided 
at the time of trial), that in his judgment, Mrs. Wagner was 
appropriate for nursing home care.   
 Fair Acres argued that Mrs. Wagner's "sustained 
combative and assaultive behavior distinguished her from Fair 
Acres' patients and prevented her from being qualified for 
admission" (Appellee's brief at 15), because its guidelines 
prohibited it from admitting psychiatric patients.  Challenging 
(..continued) 
the Rehabilitation Act and under the ADA were similar and that 
the case would be submitted to the jury under the Rehabilitation 
Act only.  Because the court did not submit the ADA claim to the 
jury and based its opinion granting judgment as a matter of law 
for Fair Acres solely on the Rehabilitation Act, we have no 
record before us from which we can review Mrs. Wagner's ADA 
claim.  Accordingly, we do not address the standards or proofs 
for establishing a claim under the ADA. 
  
Mrs. Wagner's expert witnesses' lack of consideration for her 
need for one-on-one supervision, Fair Acres contended that it is 
not equipped, due to its staff to patient ratio, to provide one-
on-one supervision for prolonged periods of time.  It further 
asserted that Dr. Kim's testimony was at odds with and often 
contradicted his own progress notes, which indicated that Mrs. 
Wagner was still exhibiting symptoms of agitation and 
combativeness at the time when he claimed she became suitable for 
transfer to a nursing facility.   
 On September 22, 1993, at the close of all the 
evidence, Fair Acres moved for judgment as a matter of law 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.  The court reserved its judgment 
on this motion and submitted the case to the jury on one issue -- 
whether Margaret Wagner was "otherwise qualified" for admission 
into Fair Acres within the meaning of section 504.  After 
deliberating, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. 
Wagner. 
 On October 5, 1993, Fair Acres renewed its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a new 
trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), asserting that Mrs. 
Wagner was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of 
section 504 because she did not meet all of Fair Acres 
requirements for admission.4  Fair Acres also contended, for the 
                     
4
.   In support of its motion for a new trial, Fair Acres 
asserted that:  (1) the court erred in failing to give proper 
judicial deference to the judgment of Fair Acres administrators; 
(2) the court erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction 
regarding the deference to which Fair Acres administrators were 
entitled; (3) the court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. 
  
first time, that Mrs. Wagner had not been discriminated against 
"solely by reason of handicap."5  On October 7, 1993, Mrs. Wagner 
filed a motion for a new trial limited to damages only.   
 On February 15, 1994, the district court entered its 
order granting Fair Acres' motion for judgment as a matter of law 
and conditionally granting its motion for a new trial.  The 
district court found that Mrs. Wagner was not an "otherwise 
qualified" handicapped individual who had been denied a benefit 
solely by reason of her handicap, because according to the court, 
she "sought admission to Fair Acres because of her handicap and 
not in spite of it."  Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, 859 
F. Supp. 776, 782 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  According to the court, the 
decision not to admit Mrs. Wagner was a medical treatment 
decision made by Fair Acres' medical and health care 
(..continued) 
Etemad regarding Mrs. Wagner's condition after March 3, 1993; (4) 
the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that when 
evaluating the alleged discrimination on the part of Fair Acres, 
the jury was not to consider any evidence that related to Mrs. 
Wagner's condition after March 3, 1993; and (5) the verdict is 
against the weight of the evidence.   
5
.   This issue was not submitted to the jury.  During its 
charge to the jury, after instructing the jury that in order to 
establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
meet four requirements, the district court stated:   
 
 In this case, I think only one of those 
requirements is at issue here, and that is 
the issue of whether or not she was otherwise 
qualified for participation in this program 
so that's the only issue I think you need to 
address in this case. 
 
(A. 384).  Counsel agreed that this was the only aspect of Mrs. 
Wagner's prima facie case at issue.  (A. 319). 
  
professionals, and medical treatment decisions are generally 
immune from scrutiny under section 504.  Observing that Fair 
Acres admits patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease, the 
court also held that section 504, by its very terms, does not 
cover discrimination among similarly handicapped persons.  
Finally, the court concluded that Mrs. Wagner was not "otherwise 
qualified" for admission to Fair Acres based on the evidence 
introduced at trial, because "it was not the function of Fair 
Acres to provide psychiatric services for persons with disruptive 
psychotic disorders."  Wagner v. Fair Acres, 859 F. Supp. at 783.  
Accordingly, the court concluded that Mrs. Wagner failed to 
establish a case for relief under section 504. 
 The district court, in ruling on Fair Acres' motion for 
a new trial, agreed with Fair Acres that its failure to instruct 
the jury that some measure of deference should be given to the 
judgment of the administrators of Fair Acres, constituted 
prejudicial error.  The district court also found that the 
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that a 
final determination that Fair Acres violated section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act would result in a miscarriage of justice.6  
The district court denied Mrs. Wagner's motion for a new trial on 
the issue of damages.   
                     
6
.   With respect to Fair Acres' third and fourth grounds 
for a new trial, the district court held that the admission of 
Dr. Etemad's testimony, over Fair Acres' objection, did not 
amount to prejudicial error.  See n.4 supra. 
  
 On February 18, 1994, Mrs. Wagner filed her notice of 
appeal from the district court's order entering judgment as a 
matter of law and conditionally granting Fair Acres' motion for a 
new trial.  Mrs. Wagner did not appeal from the district court's 
denial of her motion for a new trial on damages. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.7 
                     
7
.   On or about November 7, 1993, Mrs. Wagner was approved 
for admission to Fair Acres.  As counsel for Mrs. Wagner 
concedes, the fact that Mrs. Wagner currently resides at Fair 
Acres moots her claim for injunctive relief.  Nonetheless, this 
does not moot her claim for declaratory relief and an award of 
attorney's fees and costs because we find that her claim for 
declaratory relief falls within the exception to the mootness 
doctrine characterized by the Supreme Court as "capable of 
repetition yet evading review."     
 
 "[T]he `capable of repetition, yet evading review' 
doctrine is limited to the situation where two elements combine:  
(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be 
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) 
there was a reasonable expectation that the complaining party 
would be subjected to the same action again."  Weinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam) (citing Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)). 
 
 Applying these principles in Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 
704 (3d Cir. 1979), we held that Doe's Rehabilitation Act 
challenge to the Pennsylvania Medical Assistance Statute (which 
limited payments for care in private mental hospitals to 60 days 
in any benefit period) was not rendered moot by Doe's discharge 
from hospitalization.  We found that the challenged action which 
ended with Doe's discharge from hospitalization was "in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation 
or expiration" and Doe's psychiatric history created "a 
reasonable expectation that the complaining party [will] be 
subjected to the same action again."  592 F.2d at 707, (citing 
Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974)). 
 
 Here too, due to the nature of Alzheimer's disease and 




 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 4, prohibits a federally funded state program from 
discriminating against a handicapped individual solely by reason 
of his or her handicap.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
reads in pertinent part: 
 No otherwise qualified handicapped individual 
in the United States, as defined in section 
706(7) of this title shall, solely by reason 
of his handicap, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of 
or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794.  A "handicapped individual" for purposes of the 
Act is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such 
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."  
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).  In order to establish a violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a 
(..continued) 
behavior, there is a reasonable expectation that Mrs. Wagner will 
be subject to the same action again.  As the medical director of 
Fair Acres testified, approximately 20-25 times a year Fair Acres 
has to transfer a patient to an acute psychiatric care facility 
for treatment.  Once stabilized, the patient is returned to Fair 
Acres.  The concern in Mrs. Wagner's case is that if she is 
discharged to an acute psychiatric care facility, such as Wills, 
Fair Acres would be free once again to refuse to admit her.  
Thus, we find that Mrs. Wagner's claim for a declaration that 
Fair Acres' requirements, policies and practices are 
discriminatory and a declaration that Fair Acres has a statutory 
obligation to make reasonable accommodations so that Mrs. Wagner 
can benefit from the services it provides is not moot. 
  
"handicapped individual" under the Act, (2) that he is "otherwise 
qualified" for the position sought, (3) that he was excluded from 
the position sought "solely by reason of his handicap," and (4) 
that the program or activity in question receives federal 
financial assistance.  Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 
F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983); Nathanson v. Medical College of 
Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991).  It is 
undisputed that Mrs. Wagner is a handicapped individual within 
the meaning of the Act and that Fair Acres is a recipient of 
federal assistance.  Indeed, the only issue submitted to the jury 
was whether Mrs. Wagner was "otherwise qualified" for admission 
to Fair Acres. 
 In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 
397 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an "otherwise qualified" 
handicapped individual is one who can meet all of a program's 
requirements in spite of his handicap.  Id. at 406.  
Significantly, the Court indicated that an individual may be 
otherwise qualified in some instances even though he cannot meet 
all of a program's requirements.  In Strathie, we observed that 
"this is the case when the refusal to modify an existing program 
would be unreasonable and thereby discriminatory."  716 F.2d at 
230. 
 Further interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in 
Davis, we held in Strathie that two factors pertain to the 
reasonableness of a refusal to accommodate a handicapped 
individual.  First, requiring accommodation is unreasonable if it 
would necessitate modification of the essential nature of the 
  
program.  Second, requiring accommodation is unreasonable if it 
would place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the 
recipient of federal funds.  Davis, 442 U.S. at 412; Strathie, 
716 F.2d at 230.  See also Easley by Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 
297 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, (Oct. 18, 1994). 
 In Easley, we held, "It follows, of course, that if 
there is no factual basis in the record demonstrating that 
accommodating the individual would require a fundamental 
modification or an undue burden, then the handicapped person is 
otherwise qualified."  Id.  Thus, in looking at whether an 
individual is otherwise qualified, we must analyze whether the 
person would be otherwise qualified if reasonable accommodations 
are made for his/her handicap.   
 
 A. 
 The district court reviewed these same cases and 
concluded that Mrs. Wagner was not an otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual because Mrs. Wagner "sought admission to 
Fair Acres because of her handicap and not in spite of her 
handicap, and thus she is not an `otherwise qualified' 
handicapped individual who has been denied a benefit solely by 
reason of handicap."  The district court concluded: 
 . . . [I]n the absence of the Alzheimer's 
disease, Mrs. Wagner would not need the 
nursing home care she sought at Fair Acres.  
Clearly she sought a benefit because of her 
handicap and not in spite of it. 
 
 Unlike the plaintiff in Nathanson [Nathanson 
v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 
1368 (3d Cir. 1991)] who sought admission to 
  
medical school in spite of her back problem, 
not because of it, and the plaintiff in 
Strathie who sought a school bus driver's 
license in spite of his deafness, not because 
of it, Mrs. Wagner sought admission to an 
institution capable of caring for Alzheimer's 
sufferers because she also suffers from 
Alzheimer's. 
 
859 F. Supp. at 782-83. 
 We believe that in focusing on why Mrs. Wagner sought 
access to Fair Acres, the district court's analysis is misplaced.  
It is irrelevant why a plaintiff sought access to a program, 
service or institution; our concern, for purposes of section 504, 
is why a plaintiff is denied access to a program, service or 
institution.  Obviously, everyone that applies for admission to a 
nursing home does so because of his or her disabilities.  Indeed, 
no one would be able to meet a nursing home's admissions 
requirements in the absence of some handicapping condition 
necessitating nursing home care.8  Further, if the district 
                     
8
.   Federal law defines a nursing home as an institution 
which: 
 
 (1) is primarily engaged in providing 
to residents 
 
 (A) Skilled nursing care and related 
services for residents who require 
medical or nursing care, 
 (B) Rehabilitation services for the 
rehabilitation of injured, 
disabled, or sick persons, or 
 (C) On a regular basis, health and 
related care and services to 
individuals who because of their 
mental or physical condition 
require care or services (above the 
level of room and board) which can 
be made available to them only 
  
court's analysis is taken to its logical extreme, no program, 
service or institution designed specifically to meet the needs of 
the handicapped would ever have to comply with section 504 
because every applicant would seek access to the program or 
facility because of a handicap, not in spite of it.  This result 
would contradict both the statutory and regulatory framework of 
section 504. 
 The legislative history of section 504 indicates that 
Congress clearly contemplated that section 504 would apply to 
nursing homes that receive federal funding.  The Senate Committee 
Report that introduced the Rehabilitation Act stated, "[T]he bill 
further proclaims a policy of nondiscrimination against otherwise 
qualified individuals with respect to participation in or access 
to any program which is in receipt of federal financial 
assistance."  S. Rep. No. 1135, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 49.  See also 
118 Cong. Rec. 32294.  The Report identified examples of the 
types of programs that section 504 was designed to cover:  
housing, transportation, education and health services.  Since 
the primary purpose of the Rehabilitation Act as enacted in 1973 
was to extend and expand the 53-year old federal-state vocational 
rehabilitation program, Congress initially defined the phrase 
"handicapped individual" in terms of employment and 
(..continued) 
through institutional facilities .  
. . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a).  Thus, individuals without disabilities or 
illnesses would not be eligible for admission to a nursing home. 
  
employability.9  However, because it was clearly the intent of 
Congress in adopting section 504, which Congress labeled 
"nondiscrimination in federal grants", the term "handicapped 
individual" was no longer to be narrowly limited to employment.  
As the Senate Report accompanying the 1974 amendments to the 
Rehabilitation Act elaborated: 
 Technical and Clarifying Changes 
 
 Definition of handicapped individual 
 
  Section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 defines "handicapped individual."  
That definition has proven to be troublesome 
in its application to provisions of the Act 
such as sections 503 and 504 because of its 
orientation toward employment and its 
relation to vocational rehabilitation 
services.  It was clearly the intent of the 
Committee and of Congress in adopting section 
503 (affirmative action) and section 504 
(nondiscrimination) that the term 
"handicapped individual" in those sections 
was not to be narrowly limited to employment 
(in the case of section 504), nor to the 
individual's potential benefit from 
vocational rehabilitation services under 
Titles I and III (in the case of both 
sections 503 and 504) of the Act. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
                     
9
.   Thus, the Act's original definition of the term 
"handicapped individual" included only those whose disability 
limited their employability, and those who could be expected to 
benefit from vocational rehabilitation.  After reviewing the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's attempts to devise 
regulations implementing the Act, Congress concluded that the 
definition of "handicapped individual", while appropriate for the 
vocational rehabilitation provisions in Titles I and III of the 
Act, was too narrow to cover the range of discriminatory 
practices in housing, education and health care programs.  School 
Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.2, 
citing S. Rep. No. 93-1297 at 16, 37-38 and 50. 
  
  The Committee substitute adds a new 
definition of "handicapped individual" for 
the purposes of titles IV and V of the Act in 
order to embody this underlying intent. 
 
  Section 504 was enacted to prevent 
discrimination against all handicapped 
individuals, regardless of their need for, or 
ability to benefit from, vocational 
rehabilitation services, in relation to 
Federal assistance in employment, housing, 
transportation, education, health services, 
or any other Federally-aided programs.  
Examples of handicapped individuals who may 
suffer discrimination in the receipt of 
Federally-assisted services but who may have 
been unintentionally excluded from the 
protection of section 504 by the references 
to enhanced employability in section 7(6) are 
as follows:  physically or mentally 
handicapped children who may be denied 
admission to Federally-supported school 
systems on the basis of their handicap; 
handicapped persons who may be denied 
admission to Federally-assisted nursing homes 
on the basis of their handicap; those persons 
whose handicap is so severe that employment 
is not feasible but who may be denied the 
benefits of a wide range of Federal programs; 
and those persons whose vocational 
rehabilitation is complete, but who may 
nevertheless be discriminated against in 
certain Federally-assisted activities. 
 
S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 6376, 6388-89.  (Emphasis added.) 
 We interpret this legislative history as indicating 
that Congress contemplated that section 504 would apply to 
nursing home admissions decisions.  Thus, we conclude that Mrs. 
Wagner was not prevented from seeking the protection of section 
504 even though she was motivated to make application to Fair 
  
Acres because of her disability.10  The district court erred, as 
a matter of law, in holding to the contrary. 
 
 B. 
 In addition to finding that Mrs. Wagner was not 
"otherwise qualified" on the ground that she sought admission to 
Fair Acres because of her handicap and not in spite of it, the 
district court also found that she was not otherwise qualified 
because Fair Acres' decision was a "medical treatment" decision.  
Citing Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) and 
United States v. University Hosp., State University of New York 
at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), the district court 
concluded that "medical treatment decisions are generally immune 
from scrutiny under section 504."  We disagree with the district 
court's characterization of this case. 
 In Bowen and University Hospital, the applicability of 
section 504 to the withholding of heroic medical treatment to 
profoundly handicapped infants was at issue.  In University 
Hospital, the United States sought an order directing University 
                     
10
.   Indeed, the entire regulatory framework of section 504 
contemplates the application of section 504 to Mrs. Wagner's 
case.  Section 504's regulations prohibit discrimination against 
the handicapped in "health, welfare and social services programs 
that require or benefit from federal financial assistance," 40 
C.F.R. § 84.51.  Thus, to exclude health care facilities from the 
coverage of section 504 would be contrary to the Department of 
Health and Human Services' regulations interpreting section 504.   
These regulations, to which we must defer, specifically provide 
that recipients of federal funding providing "health, welfare and 
other social services" are subject to section 504.  See CFR §§ 
84.51 and 84.52.   
  
Hospital to provide the Department of Health & Human Services 
with access to the medical records of a handicapped infant whose 
parents had refused to consent to corrective surgical procedures 
but, rather, had opted for conservative treatment of their 
infant's disabilities.  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that the "otherwise qualified" criteria of Section 
504 cannot be meaningfully applied to such medical treatment 
decisions.  The court observed,  
 . . . [w]here medical treatment is at issue, 
it is typically the handicap itself that 
gives rise to, or at least contributes to the 
need for services. . . .  As a result, the 
phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively 
fluid context of medical treatment decisions 
without distorting its plain meaning.  In 
common parlance, one would not ordinarily 
think of a newborn infant suffering from 
multiple birth defects as "otherwise 
qualified" to have corrective surgery 
performed. . . . If Congress intended section 
504 to apply in this manner, it chose strange 
language indeed. . . .  The legislative 
history, moreover, indicates that Congress 
never contemplated section 504 would apply to 
treatment decision of this nature. 
 
729 F.2d at 156. 
 Similarly, the issue in Bowen was whether the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services had authority under the 
Rehabilitation Act to regulate medical treatment decisions 
concerning handicapped newborn infants.  The Supreme Court, 
however, did not reach the issue of whether a medical treatment 
decision made on the basis of handicap is immune from scrutiny 
under section 504, because the Court held there was no evidence 
that the hospitals had denied treatment on the basis of handicap.  
  
Rather, treatment was denied because of the absence of parental 
consent.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded, "A hospital's 
withholding of treatment from a handicapped infant when no 
parental consent has been given cannot violate Section 504, for 
without the parent's consent the infant is neither `otherwise 
qualified' for treatment nor has he been denied care solely by 
reason of his handicap."  476 U.S. at 610. 
 Unlike these medical treatment cases involving 
handicapped infants which necessitate complex assessments of the 
medical needs, benefits and risks of providing invasive medical 
care, the issue we confront here concerns the "essential nature" 
of the service that Fair Acres provides and involves an 
assessment of whether providing the skilled nursing care, which 
no one disputes Mrs. Wagner required, would alter the essential 
nature of Fair Acres' program or impose an undue burden in light 
of its program.  See, e.g., Easley by Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 
at 305.  A decision of this type, regarding whether an 
institution can provide certain services without a modification 
of the essential nature of its program or imposition of an undue 
burden, involves administrative decision-making and not medical 
judgment.  For example, here Fair Acres must determine whether it 
is able to provide the requisite staff (i.e., nurses and nurses 
aids to care for, i.e., feed, bathe, and occupy Mrs. Wagner) as 
well as the appropriate physical accommodations without incurring 
extensive cost.  These are decisions that administrators 




 Applying these legal principles, we now review the 
record to determine whether Mrs. Wagner presented legally 
sufficient evidence that she was "otherwise qualified" for 
admission to Fair Acres.  Exercising plenary review over the 
district court's order granting Fair Acres' motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, we examine the record to determine whether 
the evidence presented was sufficient to permit the jury to find 
that Mrs. Wagner was "otherwise qualified."  When reviewing the 
jury's finding that Mrs. Wagner was "otherwise qualified" for 
admission to Fair Acres, we give to her, as the verdict winner, 
the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from 
the evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in 
her favor and, in general, view the record in the light most 
favorable to her.  See Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 
F.2d at 1348 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 A. 
 In support of her assertion that there was a legally 
sufficient basis for the jury's determination that she was an 
"otherwise qualified individual," Mrs. Wagner points to the 
testimony of her three expert witness.  Dr. Gottlieb reviewed 
Mrs. Wagner's medical records of her psychiatric hospitalization 
at Wills from September 2, 1992 until April 12, 1993.  Based upon 
his review of these records, it was his opinion that Mrs. 
Wagner's behavior was consistent with a large proportion of 
people suffering from Alzheimer's disease.  (A. 43).  Dr. 
  
Gottlieb testified that the largest proportion of people in 
nursing home settings have Alzheimer's disease and that Mrs. 
Wagner was appropriate or qualified for the services and type of 
intermediate care provided by Fair Acres Nursing home.  Based on 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he believed it 
appropriate to transfer Mrs. Wagner back to a nursing home 
setting sometime between the end of September and the end of 
October of 1992.  (A. 94).   
 Dr. Gottlieb also testified regarding the type of 
accommodations that Fair Acres would have to make in order to 
care for Mrs. Wagner.  (A. 56).  He testified that Mrs. Wagner's 
combative assaultive behavior occurred relatively infrequently, 
rarely more than once a day, and often it was predictable as to 
when this behavior would occur.  (A. 79).  Thus, he concluded 
that she would need one-to-one supervision infrequently.  (A. 
57).   
 Dr. Kim, Mrs. Wagner's treating psychiatrist at Wills 
testified that she did not require one-to-one supervision for 
extended periods of time and could be redirected easily.  It was 
his opinion that about the third week of October, 1992, Mrs. 
Wagner could have been managed and accommodated by a nursing 
home.11  (A. 124).  Indeed, on October 23, 1992, Dr. Kim had 
                     
11
.   Although Mrs. Wagner's records were evaluated for 
purposes of admission to Fair Acres on five different occasions, 
counsel for Mrs. Wagner conceded that, "There was no real factual 
dispute between the parties in regard to the first two evaluation 
dates.  The testimony of both Dr. Gottlieb and Dr. Kim supports 
Fair Acres' decision on those two dates."  Appellants' brief at 
p. 17. 
  
written a letter to the administrator of Fair Acres stating that 
should Mrs. Wagner experience a deterioration in her mental 
status requiring rehospitalization, he would be willing to 
readmit her to Wills for further treatment and stabilization.  
(A. 126).  
   Dr. Etemad, the staff psychiatrist at Easton Nursing 
facility, testified that Easton Nursing Home is a regular nursing 
home that has patients at different levels of functioning.  
Although Dr. Etemad did not review the Wills records, he reviewed 
a final summary by a psychiatrist who was sent to Easton Nursing 
Home when Mrs. Wagner was transferred.  (A. 173).  Dr. Etemad 
evaluated Mrs. Wagner on April 14, two days after her admission 
to Easton and again around May 18, 1992.  He testified that he 
saw her one time after that, and then there were no more requests 
by the staff for him to see her.  During the five months 
preceding trial that Mrs. Wagner spent at Easton, Dr. Etemad 
informed the court that it was not necessary for her to be 
referred to an inpatient psychiatric hospital and that Easton was 
able to accommodate her and meet her needs.  (A. 167).  In his 
judgment, she is most appropriately classified as a nursing home 
patient.     
 Fair Acres' defense consisted of Mrs. Wagner's medical 
records and progress notes from her hospitalization at Wills, and 
the testimony of various members of Fair Acres' admissions 
committee who evaluated Mrs. Wagner's application for admission.  
R.N. Mimi Huver-Delaney, the Admissions Director at Fair Acres 
since 1982, testified that up to February 19, 1993, Fair Acres 
  
would not have been staffed to handle the kind of treatment that 
Mrs. Wagner required.  (A. 236).  Admissions case worker Amy 
Thomas testified that Mrs. Wagner was not admitted to Fair Acres 
because they could not meet her needs. 
 Dr. Satyendra K. Diwan testified that, as a consultant 
to Fair Acres since 1981, he did not examine Mrs. Wagner 
personally but instead reviewed Mrs. Wagner's records with 
respect to her admission at Fair Acres.  He is not board 
certified in either psychiatry or geriatric psychology.  (A. 
258).  Dr. Diwan testified that he does not rely on any written 
criteria in order to evaluate whether someone is appropriate for 
admission.  His own personal criterion is that the patient be 
symptom-free of agitation for a 3-4 week period.  (A. 278-280).12 
 Dr. Diwan testified that Mrs. Wagner was inappropriate 
for care at Fair Acres the five times he reviewed her, mainly 
because of her dangerousness towards herself and others.  (A. 
259).  He was not aware that, prior to her last review, she was 
not ambulating as her physical condition had weakened, nor was he 
aware of the fact that she was spending approximately 80% of her 
day confined in a geri-chair.  (A. 275). 
                     
12
.   The reasonableness of this requirement for admission 
was called into question by Mrs. Wagner's experts.  Dr. Kim 
testified that, by and large, a three week period without any 
symptoms of agitation is uncommon in many Alzheimer's patients 
and that it would be fairly common that a patient would exhibit 
some form of agitation on a daily basis.  (A. 125).  Dr. Etemad 
testified that it was not reasonable medical practice to look for 
symptom free behavior, i.e., no agitation for a 3-week period, as 
a precondition of admission to a nursing home.  In his practice, 
he has never seen a patient who was totally asymptomatic before 
transfer to a nursing home.  (A. 178).    
  
   Linda Hadfield, admissions coordinator at Fair Acres, 
testified that she visits almost every patient before admission 
to Fair Acres.  (A. 298).  She visited Mrs. Wagner on October 23, 
immediately prior to the third review.  (A. 300).  She discussed 
the techniques employed by Wills to calm Mrs. Wagner:  they would 
put her in a quiet room, massage her feet, play soft music for 
her -- techniques Fair Acres would not provide.  (A. 301).  On 
October 29th, the third meeting, Fair Acres put Mrs. Wagner on 
"for hold" status.  (A. 302).  Hadfield visited Wills again on 
December 30, between the third and fourth evaluation of Mrs. 
Wagner's application for admission.  She observed that Wills was 
still using the quiet room and inapsine to calm Mrs. Wagner.  (A. 
304).  She testified that the nurse's notes did not always 
reflect what the psychiatric doctor wrote.  (A. 304). 
 
 B. 
 Based upon its review of this evidence, the district 
court held that there was no legally sufficient basis for the 
jury's determination that Margaret Wagner was an "otherwise 
qualified" individual for purposes of section 504,13 because the 
                     
13
.   The third requirement for proving a case under section 
504 is that the discrimination be "solely by reason of handicap."  
29 U.S.C. § 794.  Although the parties agreed that this 
requirement was not an issue in this case, the district court 
appears to have conflated the issue of Mrs. Wagner's 
qualifications for admission with the issue of whether she was 
denied access to Fair Acres "solely by reason of handicap," a 
separate inquiry in the 504 analysis, not at issue in this case.  
The district court, citing Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 
F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1992), observed: 
 
  
court found that she did not meet Fair Acres' requirements for 
admission.  The district court opined, "It was not the function 
of Fair Acres to provide psychiatric services for persons with 
disruptive psychotic disorders."  Further, the court opined, "Nor 
is it a case of Fair Acres making a reasonable accommodation."  
859 F. Supp. at 783.  The district court's conclusions, in these 
regards, are erroneous.  Because the district court arrived at 
these conclusions based upon the application of incorrect legal 
precepts, our review is plenary .  Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 
F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993). 
 
 IV. 
 The inquiry into whether an applicant is otherwise 
qualified necessarily involves a determination of whether the 
(..continued) 
 Section 504, by its very terms, does not 
cover discrimination among similarly 
handicapped persons.  The word solely 
provides the key:  the discrimination must 
result from the handicap alone.  If others 
with the same handicap do not suffer the 
discrimination, then the discrimination does 
not result `solely by reason of [the] 
handicap.' 
 
589 F. Supp. at 782 (citations omitted).   
 
 Here there was no dispute that Fair Acres accepted 
patients with Alzheimer's disease, but that Mrs. Wagner's 
aggressive behavior distinguished her and set her apart from the 
other residents of Fair Acres.  Mrs. Wagner's complaint alleged 
that Fair Acres refused to accept her as a patient "solely by 
reason of her handicap (specifically, the resultant aggressive 
behavior when agitated)."  Complaint ¶ 24, JA 13.  Fair Acres 
never disputed that Mrs. Wagner was rejected due to the 
behavioral aspects of her disease. 
  
applicant could have gained access to the program if the 
recipient of funds had made reasonable accommodations.  Alexander 
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).  In the unanimous decision 
in Alexander, the Supreme Court stated: 
 Davis . . . struck a balance between the 
statutory rights of the handicapped to be 
integrated into society and the legitimate 
interests of federal grantees in preserving 
the integrity of their programs:  while a 
grantee need not be required to make 
"fundamental" or "substantial" modifications 
to accommodate the handicapped, it may be 
required to make "reasonable" ones. 
 
 The balance struck in Davis requires that an 
otherwise qualified individual must be 
provided with meaningful access to the 
benefit that the grantee offers.  The benefit 
itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way 
that effectively denies otherwise qualified 
individuals the meaningful access to which 
they are entitled; to assure meaningful 
access, reasonable accommodations in the 
grantee's program or benefit may have to be 
made. 
 
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (citation and footnotes omitted). 
 As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed 
in Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1988), "After 
Alexander, it is clear that the phrase `otherwise qualified' has 
a paradoxical quality; on the one hand, it refers to a person who 
has the abilities or characteristics sought by the grantee; but 
on the other, it cannot refer only to those already capable of 
meeting all the requirements -- or else no reasonable requirement 
could ever violate section 504, no matter how easy it would be to 
accommodate handicapped individuals who cannot fulfill it."  834 
F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1988).  We agree with the Court of Appeals 
  
for the Fifth Circuit:  "The question after Alexander is the 
rather mushy one of whether some `reasonable accommodation' is 
available to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the grantee 
and the handicapped person."  834 F.2d at 1262.   
 In light of Alexander and our decision in Strathie, we 
are required to review the record to determine additionally if 
there was a factual basis in the record demonstrating that Fair 
Acres' refusal to accommodate Mrs. Wagner was unreasonable.  See 
Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230 (a section 504 claim could be defeated 
"if there is a factual basis in the record reasonably 
demonstrating that accommodating the individual would require 
either a modification of the essential nature of the program or 
impose an undue burden on the recipient of federal funds").  See 
also School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 
(1987) (determinations regarding whether plaintiffs are 
"otherwise qualified" will generally require an individualized 
inquiry and appropriate findings of fact).   
 Here there was ample evidence that Mrs. Wagner's 
aggressive behaviors associated with her Alzheimer's disease 
clearly rendered her, as amicus curiae characterizes her, "a 
challenging and demanding patient."  We find that this fact alone 
cannot justify her exclusion from a nursing home that receives 
federal funds.  Otherwise nursing homes would be free to "pick 
and choose" among patients, accepting and admitting only the 
  
easiest patients to care for, leaving the more challenging and 
demanding patients with no place to turn for care.14 
 Indeed, the evidence introduced at trial confirmed that 
Mrs. Wagner was a difficult patient, one for whom the ravages of 
Alzheimer's disease were manifested in a myriad of extremely 
unpleasant ways -- by mood swings, periods of combativeness, and 
outbursts of shouting.  However, as Mrs. Wagner's expert witness, 
Dr. Gottlieb, pointed out, "the fact that she had agitated 
behavior does not contradict that she could be managed in a 
nursing home."  (A. 83-84).    
 Our review of the record reveals that Fair Acres 
presented little or no evidence about the type of accommodations 
it would have needed to make in order to provide care for Mrs. 
                     
14
.   Dr. Gottlieb testified at trial that currently 
approximately four million Americans have been diagnosed with 
Alzheimer's disease and it is estimated that this disease affects 
11 percent of all Americans who are over the age of 65.  
Moreover, the number of Americans afflicted with Alzheimer's 
disease is expected to increase with the size of the burgeoning 
elderly population.  (A. 36).  Consequently, many people who 
suffer from Alzheimer's will be forced to seek nursing home 
placement.  Because Mrs. Wagner's plight is typical of a growing 
number of others, the issue of whether Fair Acres was required, 
in keeping with section 504, to make reasonable accommodations to 
care for Mrs. Wagner should have been, but was not, addressed. 
 
 The Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders 
Association of Greater Philadelphia points out in its amicus 
brief that "Contrary to the commonly held belief that nursing 
homes are `genteel rest homes for elderly people, the prevalence 
of psychiatric behavioral disorders in nursing homes has been 
estimated to range from 68 to 94 percent,'" citing Grossberg, 
Psychiatric Problems in the Nursing Home, 38 J. of the American 
Geriatrics Sec. 907 (1990).  A recent study of a community 
nursing home suggests that 16 percent of the residents had at 
least one behavioral problem.  Id. 
  
Wagner.  While Fair Acres made general allegations that it could 
not adequately care for Mrs. Wagner or meet her needs due to her 
aggressive behavior, it failed to offer any factual basis 
demonstrating that the admission of Mrs. Wagner to Fair Acres 
would have changed the essential nature of the facility as a 
nursing home or imposed an undue burden on the facility, 
economically or otherwise. 
 Larry Rendin, the medical director at Fair Acres for 
the past fifteen years, testified that of the 900 patients at his 
facility, some 64 to 70% are afflicted with Alzheimer's or 
dementia-related disease, that is, organic brain syndrome of one 
type or another.15  Mr. Rendin agreed that some of the 
characteristics of the Alzheimer's patients at Fair Acres 
                     
15
.   The fact that Fair Acres admits some patients suffering 
from certain forms of Alzheimer's has no impact on Mrs. Wagner's 
504 claim.  While section 504 does not apply to programs choosing 
among similarly handicapped people, an action under section 504 
exists if a program is found to discriminate between distinct 
classes of handicapped persons.  For instance, a program barring 
all severely retarded persons from a program available to mildly 
retarded persons may be discriminatory.  See, e.g., Clark v. 
Cohen, 613 F. Supp. at 693 (holding that the claim of a denial of 
access to a program based on the relative aspects of a handicap 
[e.g., mildly retarded as opposed to severely retarded] qualifies 
under section 504); Jackson by Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital 
and Training School, 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M.), rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding the failure 
of programs for the developmentally disabled to accommodate the 
severely handicapped in existing community programs while serving 
less severely handicapped persons is unreasonable and 
discriminatory because the severity of plaintiff's handicaps is 
itself a handicap which, under section 504, cannot be the sole 
reason for denying access to community programs); Plummer by 
Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1984) (the 
severity of the plaintiffs' handicaps is itself a handicap which 
under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act cannot be the 
sole reason for denying them Title XX funding). 
  
included screaming, yelling, confusion, agitation, combativeness 
and aggression on occasion and that "Fair Acres takes care of 
them and the staff is equipped to deal with that."  (A. 95).  He 
agreed that some patients require one-to-one care for certain 
periods of time, and many times Fair Acres has two or three staff 
members providing care to one patient.  His facility is equipped 
to provide that level of care.  (A. 97).  Rendin also testified 
that between 20-25 times a year it is necessary to transfer a 
patient from Fair Acres to an in-patient psychiatric facility.  
(A. 98).  Most are returned to Fair Acres after a few weeks and 
Fair Acres is then able to accommodate their needs.  (A. 99).  
Thus the record reveals Fair Acres is clearly capable of 
providing and, in fact, has provided the kinds of services that 
Mrs. Wagner required, although she may have needed them on a more 
frequent basis. 
 Linda Hadfield, Fair Acres' admissions coordinator, 
discussed the techniques employed by Wills to calm Mrs. Wagner 
during her disturbances.  These techniques included putting Mrs. 
Wagner in a "quiet room,"16 massaging her feet, talking to her 
and playing soft music.  Although Ms. Hadfield testified that 
Fair Acres did not provide these services, there was no evidence 
that these were calming techniques that Fair Acres could not 
provide, or that to do so would change the essential nature of 
Fair Acres as a nursing home into an acute psychiatric facility 
or impose an undue burden on Fair Acres. 
                     
16
.   A "quiet room" is an ordinary patient room that simply 
has one bed.  (A. 154). 
  
 Ms. Hadfield opined that Mrs. Wagner was also not 
suitable for admission to Fair Acres because she had been 
receiving injections of Inapsine at Wills, a drug that Fair Acres 
had not previously administered.  Dr. Kim testified that he 
prescribed Inapsine for Mrs. Wagner while she was at Wills 
because Inapsine is a neuroleptic, or tranquilizing agent, which 
is very short acting and is available in vials and ampoules.  It 
is administered by intramuscular injection.  Notwithstanding the 
fact that Inapsine had not been administered at Fair Acres 
before, Dr. Gottlieb testified that Inapsine could be 
administered in a nursing home setting and that roughly 25 
percent of the people in nursing homes receive supertrophic, 
sedating drugs on a daily basis.  Dr. Gottlieb's testimony was 
further supported by Larry Rendin when he testified that many of 
the patients at Fair Acres are administered Haldol.  (A. 107).  
Thus, based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude 
that the accommodations Fair Acres would need to make to care for 
Mrs. Wagner were not unreasonable.   
 Fair Acres also contended that accommodating Mrs. 
Wagner would have created a health and safety risk to the staff 
and patients at Fair Acres.  (A. 389).  Dr. Diwan testified that 
"each time I concluded that she is not appropriate because mainly 
of her dangerousness towards others and herself."  (A. 260).  Our 
review reveals that Dr. Diwan's testimony was contradicted by the 
testimony of Mrs. Wagner's treating physician at Wills, Dr. Kim.  
Dr. Kim testified that he did not view Mrs. Wagner as creating a 
health or safety risk.  With respect to the references in her 
  
chart that she was combative and assaultive, Dr. Kim testified 
that, "[W]e describe being combative or assaultive as any 
behavior that is resistive or aggressive. . . .  But this is all 
[done by] someone who is essentially bedridden and can barely 
[sic] walk and is more or less slapping out like a child."  (A. 
129).  Dr. Kim also testified on cross-examination that at the 
time of Mrs. Wagner's final evaluation in early February, she was 
spending 60-80% of her waking hours in a geri-chair, and that she 
needed 80% support by staff to remain upright.  (A. 155).  Thus, 
there was sufficient evidence presented from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Mrs. Wagner, at least by February, posed 
little threat to anyone's health or safety due to her extremely 
weakened physical condition. 
 Finally, by the later dates on which Mrs. Wagner was 
denied admission to Fair Acres, the jury could infer from the 
evidence that Mrs. Wagner would not have needed a quiet room or 
much of anything in the way of reasonable accommodation.  For 
example, Dr. Kim testified that, "We noted that progressively she 
became more and more physically handicapped.  She needed 
increasing assistance to walk, she needed to be spoon-fed, by the 
end of her stay, she became incontinent, needed to be in a 
diaper, and spent most of her days sitting in a chair staring off 
into space, occasionally making semi-coherent expressions, 
sometimes crying.  But for the most part staring blankly off into 
space for a majority of that time."  (A. 128). 
 Based on our review of the evidence, we find that a 
jury could have determined that at some point during the period 
  
from September 1992 to February 1993, Mrs. Wagner was "otherwise 
qualified" for admission to Fair Acres in accordance with section 
504 because Fair Acres could have cared for her if it made 
reasonable accommodations.  Thus, we must reverse the district 
court's order granting summary judgment as a matter of law. 
 
 V. 
 Concurrent with its motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, Fair Acres moved in the alternative for a new trial.  The 
district court conditionally granted Fair Acres' motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that:  (1) it was prejudicial error to fail 
to instruct the jury that administrators of Fair Acres were 
entitled to "some measure of deference," and (2) the verdict was 
against the great weight of the evidence.   
 The authority to grant a new trial resides in the 
exercise of sound discretion by the trial court, and will only be 
disturbed if the court abused that discretion.  Allied Chemical 
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); American Bearing 
Co. v. Litton Industries, Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 948 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984).  We are cognizant that a new 
trial may be granted even when judgment as a matter of law is 
inappropriate.  Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 735 
(3d Cir. 1988); American Bearing Co., 729 F.2d at 948 n.11.  See 
also Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 812 F.2d 971, 
972 (5th Cir.) (affirming grant of new trial even though there 
was "legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict, thus 
foreclosing a j.n.o.v."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).  
  
With these principles in mind, we review the district court's 
conditional grant of Fair Acres' alternative motion for a new 
trial. 
 A. 
 At the close of all the evidence, Fair Acres submitted 
the following instruction for inclusion in the court's points for 
charge: 
 Administrators from Fair Acres Geriatric 
Center are entitled to some measure of 
judicial deference in this matter, by reason 
of their experience with and knowledge of the 
administrative procedures in question. 
 
Defendants' proposed points of charge No. 6.  Counsel for Mrs. 
Wagner objected to this point for charge because counsel did not 
believe the charge to be a correct statement of the law.  The 
district court sustained Mrs. Wagner's objection and decided not 
to include this point in its charge to the jury.  (A. 328).17  In 
ruling on the motion for a new trial, the district court found 
its refusal to give this charged constituted prejudicial error.  
We disagree. 
 We addressed the issue of the deference to be given the 
judgment of program administrators in cases arising under section 
                     
17
.   Mrs. Wagner points out that Fair Acres failed to 
preserve this as an issue, because Fair Acres did not object to 
the court's refusal to include the proposed instructions, either 
at the discussion of the points for charge on the record or after 
the charges to the jury.  (See N.T. 9/2/93 at p. 15, and J.A. 
389.)  However, where an error in the instruction to the jury is 
fundamental or may cause a miscarriage of justice, the court's 
error in instructing the jury may be the basis for granting a new 
trial, even if no proposed objection was raised.  Morley v. 
Branca, 456 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
504 in our decision in Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 
(3d Cir. 1983).  There we rejected the notion that broad judicial 
deference was required, and instead we observed, 
 Notably absent from the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Davis, however, is any discussion 
of the scope of judicial review with regard 
to the reasonableness of a refusal to 
accommodate a handicapped individual.  
Program administrators surely are entitled to 
some measure of judicial deference in this 
matter, by reason of their experience in 
question.  On the other hand, broad judicial 
deference resembling that associated with the 
"rational basis" test would substantially 
undermine Congress' intent in enacting 
section 504 that stereotypes or 
generalizations not deny handicapped 
individuals access to federally-funded 
programs. 
 
716 F.2d at 231 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).  We then 
held that "the following standard effectively reconciles these 
competing considerations:  a handicapped individual who cannot 
meet all of a program's requirements is not otherwise qualified 
if there is a factual basis in the record reasonably 
demonstrating that accommodating that individual would require 
either a modification of the essential nature of the program, or 
impose an undue burden on the recipient of federal funds."  716 
F.2d at 231.  We observed that the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has also applied this "factual basis" standard, 
although it did not designate it as such.  See New York State 
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (section 504 prevented a city board of education from 
excluding from its regular classrooms mentally retarded children 
  
who were thought to be carriers of hepatitis, when the board was 
unable to demonstrate that the health hazard posed by the 
children was anything more than a remote possibility).18 
 In the present case, there was no factual basis 
demonstrating that accommodating Mrs. Wagner would require Fair 
Acres to modify the essential nature of its program, or impose an 
undue burden upon it.  In the absence of such a factual basis, 
Fair Acres' request that the jury be instructed that Fair Acres 
administrators be accorded "some" deference cannot be justified.  
Accordingly, the district court's failure to give an instruction 
that Fair Acres administrators were entitled to some measure of 
deference by reason of their experience with and knowledge of the 
procedures in question, was not legal error.  Clearly it would 
not then rise to the level of fundamental error.   
 Here the district court's instructions to the jury in 
this regard struck the appropriate balance between deference to 
program administrators and the anti-discrimination mandate of 
section 504.  The district court informed the jury that while 
Fair Acres was required to make reasonable accommodations, it was 
not required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to 
its program.19  Additionally, the district court instructed the 
                     
18
.   See also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that courts should 
give deference to the medical judgments of independent public 
health officials on the issue of the contagiousness of infectious 
diseases but left open the question of whether courts should also 
defer to the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians 
upon which an employer has reasonably relied.  Id. at 288, n.18. 
 
19
.   The district court charged: 
  
jury that it must consider the views and evaluation process of 
Fair Acres.  The court instructed the jury that it "must take 
(..continued) 
 
  Now, the law also requires, however, 
that a nursing home facility such as Fair 
Acres make reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical and mental limitations of an 
otherwise-qualified handicapped person.  But 
they are not required to make fundamental or 
substantial modifications to their program.  
In other words, they are not required to 
become something other than what they purport 
to be; that is, a skilled long-term nursing 
home with certain admission criteria which 
they believe they are entitled to use and 
determine who should be admitted and who 
should not be admitted. 
 
  The accommodation that the law requires 
them to make must be reasonable; it can't be 
unreasonable.  This is just an analogy, it 
may not be applicable in this case, but they 
cannot make a nursing home -- turn it into a 
burn center or a psychiatric institution or 
something like that, because that would 
require substantial or fundamental 
modification of the program which they have 
in existence. 
 
  But on the other hand, if their program 
would accommodate Mrs. Wagner with only 
inconsequential or nonsubstantial changes, 
then under the law they are required to do 
that. 
 
  So that if you find that a fundamental 
or substantial modification is necessary in 
order to accommodate the plaintiff, the 
Rehabilitation Act does not apply. 
 
  On the other hand, if they can 
accommodate her with reasonable changes in 





into account the evaluation made by the institution itself in the 
absence of a showing that its standards and its application of 
those standards serves no purpose other than to deny access to 
handicapped persons."  (A. 385). 
 
 B. 
 Finally, the district court conditionally granted Fair 
Acres' motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was 
against the great weight of the evidence.  The district court 
found "the evidence, as demonstrated by the Wills records, 
incontrovertibly and overwhelmingly showed that at the time Fair 
Acres made the decision that Mrs. Wagner was not appropriate for 
placement in its nursing home she was suffering from the same 
psychotic symptoms that caused her transfer from the Dowden 
Nursing Home to Wills Psychiatric Hospital."  Under these 
circumstances, "a final determination that Fair Acres violated 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would result in a 
miscarriage of justice."  859 F. Supp. at 785. 
 The authority to grant a new trial, as previously 
stated, is confined to the trial court.  Thus, our review is 
extremely deferential.  We have held that "[s]uch deference is 
peculiarly appropriate in reviewing a ruling that a verdict is 
against the weight of the evidence because the district court was 
able to observe the witnesses and follow the trial in a way that 
we cannot replicate by reviewing a cold record."  Roebuck, supra, 
852 F.2d at 735. 
  
 We have reviewed the record for evidence that is 
legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  We find that 
Mrs. Wagner presented sufficient evidence to preclude the 
district court's granting judgment against her as a matter of 
law.  Given, however, the district court's application of 
incorrect legal standards regarding the applicability of section 
504 to the facts in this case, we are uncertain as to whether the 
court would have granted a new trial under the appropriate legal 
standards.  Consequently, we will vacate the court's order 
granting a new trial and remand to the district court for 
reconsideration of this motion. 
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the district 
court's order granting judgment as a matter of law and vacate the 
district court's order conditionally granting a new trial.  We 
will remand for further proceedings consistent with our decision.  
Costs are taxed against appellee. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
